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There has been much recent research on the world distribution of income, but also 
growing recognition of the importance of other contributions to well-being, including 
those of household wealth. Wealth is important in providing security and opportunity, 
particularly in poorer countries that lack full social safety nets and adequate facilities for 
borrowing and lending. We find, however, that it is precisely in the latter countries 
where household wealth is the lowest, both in absolute and relative terms. Globally, 
wealth is more concentrated than income both on an individual and national basis. 
Roughly thirty percent of world wealth is found in each of North America, Europe, and 
the rich Asian-Pacific countries. These areas account for virtually all of the world’s top 
1 per cent of wealth holders. On an official exchange rate basis India accounts for about 
a quarter of the adults in the bottom three global wealth deciles while China provides 
about a third of those in the fourth to eighth deciles. If current growth trends continue, …/ 
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India, China and the transition countries will move up in the global distribution, and the 
lower deciles will be increasingly dominated by countries in Africa, Latin American and 
poor parts of the Asian-Pacific region. Thus wealth may continue to be lowest in areas 
where it is needed the most. 
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1 Introduction 
Research on economic inequality—both within countries and between countries—is 
usually framed in terms of differences in income or consumption. In recent years a 
number of studies have extended this line of work to the global stage, by attempting to 
estimate the world distribution of income: see, for example Bourguignon and Morrison 
(2002), and Milanovic (2002, 2005). The findings document the very high disparity of 
living standards amongst the world’s citizens, but indicate that the rising inequality seen 
within many countries in recent decades has not led to a clear upward trend in global 
income inequality. The lack of trend is due to the rapid increase of incomes in certain 
developing countries, of which China is by far the most important. 
Alongside this work there has been growing recognition of the importance of other 
contributions to individual wellbeing, most especially health status, but also education, 
environment, personal security, and vulnerability to natural disasters. This paper focuses 
on another dimension of human wellbeing—household wealth—by which we mean net 
worth or, more precisely, the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities.1  
Household wealth is important for a number of reasons. First, it provides a means of 
raising long term consumption, either directly by dissaving, or indirectly via the income 
stream of investment returns to assets. Second, by enabling consumption smoothing, 
ownership of wealth helps to insulate households against adverse events, especially 
those that lead to a reduction in income, such as ill health, unemployment, or simply 
growing old. Thirdly, household wealth provides a source of finance for informal sector 
and entrepreneurial activities, either directly or by use as collateral for business loans. 
These motives are less compelling in countries that have good state pension 
arrangements, adequate social safety nets and well developed source of business 
finance. By the same token, private wealth has more significance in countries which 
lack these facilities, which is the case in much of the developing world. Thus, as our 
results will make evident, household wealth tends to be lower in precisely those 
countries where it is needed most. 
Despite these reasons for interest in wealth, and other evidence that asset holdings have 
a disproportionate impact on household wellbeing and economic success, and more 
broadly on economic development and growth, data limitations have severely 
handicapped research on the topic. However, the situation has rapidly improved in 
recent years. Many OECD countries now have wealth data derived from household 
surveys, tax records or national balance sheets. Household wealth surveys have also 
been conducted in the two largest developing countries, China and India, and one 
survey with wealth results is available for Indonesia. Lists of the holdings of the super 
rich are reported at regular intervals by Forbes magazine and other media outlets. Other 
sources add insights into the level and spread of personal wealth. We therefore believe 
that there is sufficient data to support preliminary estimates of the distribution of 
household wealth across the world, which we attempt to do for the year 2000. 
                                                 
1 No attempt is made to include the present value of public pension schemes, because estimates are 
available for very few countries.   2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the 
sources and methods used in our study (these are described in more detail in Davies 
et al. 2007). Section 3 discusses results for the estimated world distribution of wealth. 
Likely future trends in wealth holding and wealth distribution are discussed in 
Section 4. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.  
2  Sources and methods 
2.1 Wealth  levels 
The estimation of wealth levels is based on the information that can be assembled from 
household balance sheets and sample surveys. Household balance sheets are often 
compiled in conjunction with the national accounts or flow of funds data while sample 
surveys derive from household interviews. Available household balance sheet 
information enables us to construct ‘complete’ financial and non-financial data for 19 
countries and financial data for 15 countries, where ‘complete’ is interpreted as full or 
almost full coverage of financial assets, and inclusion of at least owner-occupied 
housing on the non-financial side. 
The country coverage of household balance sheets is not representative of the world as a 
whole. While Europe and North America, and the OECD in general, are well covered, 
low- and middle-income countries are under-represented. In geographic terms this 
means that coverage is sparse in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. 
Fortunately for this study, these gaps were offset to an important extent by the 
availability of survey evidence for the largest developing countries, China, India, and 
Indonesia.  
Altogether we made use of full or partial data on wealth levels for 39 countries. These 
countries accounted for 61 per cent of world population in the year 2000 and, we 
estimate, more than 80 per cent of global household wealth. Regressions run on these 39 
countries allowed wealth levels to be estimated for other countries. The best predictions 
were achieved when separate regressions were run on three subcomponents of wealth: 
non-financial assets, financial assets and liabilities. Each of the regressions uses real 
consumption per capita as one of the explanatory variables.2 Population density also 
appears in the regression equation for non-financial assets, market capitalization ratio (a 
measure of the size of the stock market) in the equation for financial assets, and private 
sector domestic credits in the equation for liabilities. To control for the mixture of HBS 
and survey data sources, a survey dummy was included, although this was only 
significant for financial assets, reflecting the well-known fact that financial assets are 
under-reported in survey data. 
In the year 2000, the world comprised 229 countries. The regressions yielded 150 
countries with observed or estimated average wealth, covering 95 per cent of world 
                                                 
2 The regression results are reported in Table 5 of Davies et al. (2007). Real consumption per capita was 
used because consumption figures are available for about twice as many countries as income data, and 
hence allow imputations to be made for many more countries.   3
population. The remaining 79 countries are mostly small or insignificant in wealth 
terms. Omitting these countries implicitly suggests that they are representative of the 
world as a whole, which is patently untrue. We therefore assigned each country the 
average per capita wealth of the corresponding continental region (6 categories) and 
income class (4 categories), an admittedly crude procedure, but one that is preferable to 
the alternative default option. 
2.2  Shape of wealth distributions  
A complete picture of wealth holdings within a country requires information on the 
shape of the distribution as well as the average level. A total of 20 countries have 
reasonably reliable estimates of wealth distribution at the national level. These are listed 
in Table 1 along with the quantile share data assembled for them.3 The list includes the 
largest rich countries and the largest poor countries—the USA, Japan, Germany, UK, 
France, and Italy on one hand, and China, India and Indonesia on the other. The Nordic 
and the smaller English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) are 
also well represented. Inclusion of both the large rich countries of the West on the one 
hand, and China and India on the other, may be quite significant. Milanovic (2005) 
demonstrates that this relatively small number of countries is responsible for most of the 
recent changes in world income inequality.4 It seems likely that these key countries are 
also crucial for understanding and appreciating the global distribution of wealth. 
One set of distributional figures was selected for each country, with a preference for the 
year 2000, ceteris paribus. The data differ in many important respects across countries 
and have many well known deficiencies. For 15 of the 20 countries, the data originate 
from household surveys which tend to underestimate the share of the top wealth groups 
due to lower response rates and under-reporting of asset values, particularly financial 
assets.5 Tax records are the source of wealth distribution data for the remaining five 
countries: estate tax returns in the case of France and the UK; wealth tax records for 
Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden. Although these sources have the 
advantage that ‘response’ is involuntary and under-reporting is illegal, under-reporting 
may still occur and other valuation problems affect both the accuracy of the figures and 
the degree of comparability across countries. 
                                                 
3 Due to rounding errors, the shares do not always sum to 100 per cent. In such cases, the computation 
procedure we adopted scales the shares appropriately. 
4 See Milanovic (2005: 115). 
5 Oversampling of high income/wealth groups, as is done in Canada, Finland, Spain, and the United 
States can mitigate the differential response rates. Undervaluation of assets can also be addressed in 
principle by scaling up the reported figures.   4
Table.1: Wealth shares for countries with wealth distribution data 
      Share of lowest  Share of top 
Country   Year  Unit  10% 20% 25% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%  75% 80% 90% 10% 5% 2% 1% 0.5%  0.1% 
Australia 2002  household  0.0 0.0 1.0 4.0 9.0 16.0 25.0 38.0 56.0 45.0 32.0    
Canada 1999  family  unit  1.0 3.0 6.0 11.0 19.0 30.0 47.0  53.0    
China 2002  person  0.7 2.8 5.8 9.6 14.4 20.6 29.0 40.7 58.6 41.4    
Denmark 1996  family  unit  -14.4 -17.3 -18.1 -18.1 -17.6 -15.8 -10.5 1.3 23.6  76.4 56.0 28.8 22.2 11.6 
Finland 1998  household  -0.9 -0.9 -0.3 2.2 7.4 15.0 25.0 38.6 57.7  42.3    
France 1994  person    39.0  61.0 21.3   6.3 
Germany 1998  household  -0.3 -0.2 0.3 1.5 3.9 9.0 18.9  34.0 55.7  44.4    
India 2002-03  household  0.2 1.0 2.5 4.8 8.1 12.9 19.8 30.1 47.1 52.9 38.3 15.7    
Indonesia 1997  household  0.0 0.4 1.3 2.8 5.1 8.5 13.5 21.1 34.6 65.4 56.0 28.7    
Ireland 1987  household  0.0 0.2 2.5 6.6 12.2 18.9 28.5 40.4 57.7 42.3 28.7 10.4    
Italy 2000  household  7.0   36.2 51.5 48.5 36.4 17.2    
Japan 1999  household  0.5 2.1 4.8 8.7 13.9 20.7 29.8 42.3 60.7  39.3    
Korea, South  1988  household  0.5 1.8 4.0 7.4 12.3 18.9 27.9 39.9 56.9 43.1 31.0 14.0    
New Zealand  2001  tax unit    48.3  51.7    
Norway 2000  household  0.1 0.7 2.6 5.8 10.4 16.4 24.2 34.6 49.6  50.5    
Spain 2002  household  2.1 13.2   34.7 58.1 41.9 18.3 13.1 5.6 
Sweden 2002  household  -5.7 -6.8 -6.9 -6.6 -4.8 -0.6 7.1  19.9 41.4  58.6    
Switzerland 1997  family    28.7 71.3 58.0 34.8 27.6 16.0 
United Kingdom  2000  adult  5.0  25.0 44.0  56.0 44.0 31.0 23.0   
USA 2001  family  2.8  30.2  69.8 57.7 32.7    
Source: See Davies et al. (2007: Appendix IIC).   5
Table 1 shows that the wealth distribution data most often refers to households or 
families, but can also refer to individuals or adults. The distributional information 
usually includes the decile wealth shares, plus the share of the top 5 per cent and the top 
1 per cent of wealth holders. But there are many gaps in the coverage. The share of the 
top 10 per cent is reported for all 20 countries, and ranges from 39.3 per cent in Japan to 
71.3 per cent in Switzerland.6 The very high level of wealth concentration is even more 
evident in the share of the top 1 per cent. Amongst the 11 countries reporting that 
statistic (a group that excludes China, Germany, and the Nordic countries apart from 
Denmark), the share of the top 1 per cent ranges from 10.4 per cent in Ireland to 34.8 
per cent in Switzerland.7 
To proceed towards an estimate of the world distribution of wealth, a utility programme 
developed at UNU-WIDER was used to create a synthetic, equal weighted sample of 
1,000 observations corresponding to each of the 20 distributions recorded in Table 1. 
This ‘ungrouping’ programme can be applied to any set of quantile shares (in the form 
of Lorenz values) derived from a distribution of positive values (e.g. incomes). It begins 
by generating a sample of 1,000 observations which roughly matches the reported 
distribution, then adjusts the values until the sample properties exactly match the target 
characteristics.8 To apply this programme to the distributions in Table 1, the non-
positive values were discarded, thus treating these cells as missing observations. 
Estimating the shape of the wealth distribution for the countries not listed in Table 1 
requires more heroic assumptions. We took the view that income inequality is likely to 
be highly correlated with wealth inequality across countries, and hence drew on income 
distribution data for 144 countries contained in the World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID).9 Comparison of the Lorenz curves for wealth and income distributions for the 
20 reference countries in Table 1 reveals that the cumulative wealth shares are always 
lower than the corresponding income shares, and suggests that the ratio of the Lorenz 
ordinates for wealth and income is reasonably stable across countries. Consequently, the 
average ratio for the 20 reference countries was applied to the other 124 countries in 
order to estimate the (unknown) wealth distribution data from the available income 
distribution information. Wealth distribution figures for the remaining countries (which 
collectively account for less than 4 per cent of the world population) were again 
imputed using the average values for the corresponding region and income class. 
                                                 
6 The Danish figure of 76.4 per cent is higher still, but probably unreliable given the large negative asset 
holdings reported for half the Danish population. 
7 The sampling frame for the USA survey excludes the Forbes 400 richest families; adding them would 
raise the share of the top 1 per cent by about two percentage points; see Kennickell (2003: 3). Other 
differences in data sources and units of analysis mean that cross country variations should be interpreted 
with considerable caution. For example, the relatively low shares of top wealth groups in Australia, 
Ireland, and Japan are probably due in part to the fact that the surveys in these countries do not 
compensate for differential response by oversampling the upper tail, and we believe are consequently 
likely to underestimate the share of the top 1 per cent by about 5–10 percentage points. 
8 See Shorrocks and Wan (2008) for further details. 
9 The 144 countries covered by WIID are not a subset of the 150 nations for which mean wealth was 
obtained (from actual data or via the regressions) in Section 2. In particular, populous countries are more 
likely to report income distribution data, so the list of 144 now includes Cuba, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Serbia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan.   6
 
2.3  Computing the world distribution 
The final step in the construction of the world distribution of wealth combines 
information on the level and shape of wealth holdings. For each country, the ungrouping 
utility programme generated a sample of 1,000 observations consistent with the actual, 
estimated or imputed wealth distribution. These observations were then scaled to match 
the mean wealth, and weighted by the population size. Merging the countries into a 
single dataset produced a weighted sample of more than 200,000 observations10 from 
which the minimum wealth and the share of each percentile in the global distribution of 
wealth was estimated, along with the membership of each wealth percentile by country 
of residence. 
Two additional issues must be confronted before the global wealth distribution figures 
can be interpreted. First, what is the relevant population to which the figures refer: all 
households in the world, all individuals, or all adults? Studies of global income 
inequality typically assume that the benefits of household expenditure are shared 
equally among household members and that each person counts equally in determining 
overall inequality. Household assets like housing also provide communal benefits, but 
ownership and control of household assets does not usually extend to non-adult 
members, nor are the proceeds shared equally in the event that the assets are sold. We 
therefore took the view that it is best to disregard ownership of wealth by minors 
(specifically, those aged below 20 years) and to interpret the wealth distribution figures 
in terms of the distribution across adults.11 
The second question concerns the appropriate conversion rate for currencies in different 
countries. Studies of the global distribution of income or consumption usually use PPP 
(purchasing power parity) exchange rates to compensate for price variations across 
countries. Here, we focus on global wealth estimates based on official exchange rates on 
the grounds that wealth is heavily concentrated in the hands of the rich, whose 
expenditure for both consumption and investment purposes will often be at world prices 
rather than at the prices prevailing in their home country.12 
                                                 
10 There are 229 countries in all, but some small countries with identical imputed wealth levels and 
distributions were merged at this stage. 
11 Although the three options considered here—households, individuals and adults—are all present in the 
data reported in Table 1, most country data refer to households. Our implicit assumption that the 
distribution of wealth across adults is similar to the pattern across households is admittedly heroic given 
that almost nothing is known empirically about the relationship between the two distributions. The two 
distributions would be identical if all households contain two adults, if children have zero wealth, and if 
wealth is equally divided between the adult members. Our assumption is also plausible if household 
wealth is proportional to the number of adult members, ceteris paribus. But inaccuracies could arise if, 
for example, single person widow and widower households own disproportionate amounts of wealth. This 
is likely to be the case, although the quantitative impact on our results is unclear.   
12 Some alternative estimates using PPP rates are discussed in Section 3. Further details are reported in 
Davies et al. (2007).   7
3  The global distribution of wealth 
3.1 Wealth  inequality 
Table 2 summarizes our results on the distribution of household wealth across the world 
population of 3.7 billion adults, based on official exchange rates and figures for the year 
2000. According to our estimates, adults required just $2,138 in order to be among the 
wealthiest half of the world. But more than $61,000 was needed to belong to the top 10 
per cent and more than $510,000 per adult was required for membership of the top 1 per 
cent. The entrance fee for the top 1 per cent seems surprisingly high, given than the 
group has 37 million adult members. Furthermore, the figure refers to the year 2000 and 
is now likely to be considerably higher, especially when measured in US dollars. 
The wealth share estimates reveal that the richest 2 per cent of adult individuals own 
more than half of all global wealth, with the richest 1 per cent alone accounting for 40 
per cent of global assets. The corresponding figures for the top 5 per cent and the top 10 
per cent are 71 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively. In contrast, the bottom half of 
wealth holders together hold barely 1 per cent of global wealth. Members of the top 
decile are almost 400 times richer, on average, than the bottom 50 per cent, and 
members of the top percentile are almost 2,000 times richer. 
Additional information on wealth inequality is provided in Table 3 which reports the 
value of the Gini coefficient for the world as well as the values for individual countries. 
As mentioned earlier, in all countries which have the requisite data, wealth distribution 
is more unequal than income. The final column of Table 3 records wealth Gini estimates 
ranging from 0.547 for Japan to 0.801 for the USA and 0.803 for Switzerland. The 
global wealth Gini is estimated to be even greater at 0.892. This is equivalent to the Gini 
value that would be registered for a 100-person population in which one person receives 
$900 and the remaining 99 people each receive $1.  
By way of comparison, Milanovic (2005: 108) estimates the Gini for the world 
distribution of income to be 0.795 in 1998 using official exchange rates. Note that, 
while wealth inequality exceeds income inequality in global terms, the gap between the 
Gini coefficients for world wealth and income inequality—about 10 percentage 
points—is less than the gap at the country level, which averages about 30 percentage 
points. This is to be expected given the limited possibilities for higher Gini values 
arising from an income Gini of 0.795 and a Gini upper bound of 1. It is also worth 
pointing out that the relative insensitivity of the Gini coefficient to the tails of the 
distribution implies that our likely slight under-estimation of the top wealth shares will 
have little impact on the estimated Gini. Furthermore, concentration in the upper tail of 
the income distribution is also probably underestimated (although to a lesser extent than 
for wealth), so that the estimated gap between wealth and income inequality is unlikely 
to be heavily biased. 
   8
Table 2: Global wealth distribution in 2000: regional details based on official exchange rates 
  Decile  Top      














World wealth shares (%)  0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.4 2.7 8.7    85.2 70.7 40.1       
Minimum wealth (US$)  0.1 178 448 874 1384 2138 3467 6220 13985    61536 150182 512386       
                                  
Percentage of adults by region     
                                  
North America  0.2 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.0 2.7 4.6 7.5 13.6   27.3 28.7 38.9 225.7 6.1 190653 34.4 
L. America and Caribbean  5.9 7.1 7.0 5.4 6.3 7.6 9.9 13.1 14.8   4.8 3.0 2.2 302.9 8.2 17892 4.3 
Europe 9.4 8.4 9.3 7.8 8.2 9.7 13.0 17.1 29.7   36.2 35.6 25.8 550.6 14.9 67315 29.6 
Africa 27.2 17.8 14.4 9.2 7.7 7.3 6.9 6.4 4.3   0.7 0.3 0.2 376.3  10.2 3415 1.0 
China 6.4 14.6 15.7 37.1 40.6 39.2 35.1 29.6 9.3   0.2 0.0 0.0 842.1 22.8 3885 2.6 
India 26.5 27.2 27.5 19.7 16.8 14.8 11.6 7.4 2.6   0.2 0.0 0.0 570.6 15.4 1989 0.9 
Rich Asia-Pacific  0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.9 4.1 13.2   28.2 31.2 32.2 183.3 5.0 165008 24.1 
Other Asia-Pacific  24.4 24.3 24.7 19.0 17.8 17.7 17.2 14.7 12.5   2.4 1.2 0.6 646.1 17.5 5889 3.0 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100    100 100 100 3697.5  100 33875 100 
Source: See text.   9
Table 3: Global wealth distribution in 2000: country details based on official exchange rates 
Decile   Top   Percentage of 
adults by 












(%)  Gini 
USA 0.2 0.5  0.9  1.2 1.6 2.5 4.2 7.2 11.7 24.8 26.7 37.3 202.9  5.5 201319 32.6 0.801 
Japan     0.1 0.4 1.3 5.0 20.5  25.1 27.0 100.9 2.7 227600 18.3  0.547 
Germany 1.1 0.6  1.0  0.4 0.4 0.2 1.0 1.7 3.6 7.6 9.7 3.5 64.8  1.8 109735 5.7  0.667 
Italy     0.1 0.3 1.1 4.4 6.6  5.0 4.0 46.4 1.3 122250 4.5  0.609 
UK   0.1  0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.7 2.5 5.9 7.8 6.4 43.9  1.2 169617 5.9  0.697 
France   0.1  0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.8 4.4 4.2 4.1 5.2 44.4  1.2 114650 4.1 0.730 
Spain     0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 3.1 3.9 2.4 1.0 32.2  0.9 86958 2.2  0.570 
Canada 0.1  0.2  0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.8 2.5 2.0 1.6 22.8  0.6 95606 1.7 0.688 
Taiwan     0.1 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.8  1.5 1.2 15.5 0.4 105613 1.3  0.655 
Australia 0.1  0.2  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.8 1.3 0.7 13.7  0.4 94712 1.0  0.622 
Netherlands     0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.4 12.0  0.3 144406 1.4  0.650 
South Korea    0.1  0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.6 4.2 1.6 0.6 0.5 33.2  0.9 41256 1.1  0.579 
Brazil 2.2 2.8  2.5  1.9 2.3 2.8 3.4 4.5 4.4 1.4 0.8 0.6 104.2  2.8 14887 1.2  0.784 
Mexico 0.4 0.8  1.2  0.8 1.0 1.2 1.9 2.7 4.0 1.3 0.9 0.6 56.1  1.5 25468 1.1  0.749 
Argentina 0.1 0.3  0.3  0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.9 0.9 0.6 0.4 23.3  0.6 38406 0.7  0.740 
Switzerland     0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.2 5.5  0.1 212394 0.9  0.803 
Turkey 0.3 0.7  1.0  0.7 0.7 1.1 1.4 2.2 2.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 40.4  1.1 15252 0.5  0.718 
China 6.4 14.6  15.7  37.1 40.6 39.2 35.1 29.6 9.3 0.2  842.1 22.8 3885 2.6  0.550 
India 26.5 27.2  27.5  19.7 16.8 14.8 11.6 7.4 2.6 0.2  570.6 15.4 1989 0.9  0.669 
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Russia 4.1 3.6  3.5  3.1 3.1 3.7 3.8 2.7 1.3 0.1 0.1 107.5  2.9 3897 0.3  0.699 
Indonesia 7.5 6.0  5.5  4.2 3.2 2.7 2.9 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.1 124.4  3.4 2421 0.2  0.764 
Thailand 0.8 1.4  1.2  1.1 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.0 0.1 40.2  1.1 6307 0.2  0.710 
Pakistan 2.8 2.8  3.3  2.4 2.5 2.2 1.0 0.9 0.5  68.0  1.8 2504 0.1  0.698 
Viet Nam  2.3 2.0  2.0  1.5 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.2  44.0  1.2 1982 0.1  0.682 
Bangladesh 2.5 2.8  2.9  2.3 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.0 0.3  66.5  1.8 2392 0.1  0.660 
Nigeria 5.9 3.0  2.2  1.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1  51.4  1.4 813 0.0  0.736 
World 100 100  100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100 100 3697.5  100 33875 100  0.892 
Source: See text. 
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3.2  Geographic distribution of wealth 
The world map in Figure 1 shows the per capita wealth of different countries. Western 
Europe, North America,13 and rich Asian-Pacific nations (principally Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand) stand out as the richest areas, with per 
capita wealth exceeding $50,000 in the year 2000. Next come some prosperous 
developing and transition countries—for example Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Ukraine—in the $10,000 to $50,000 band. The large transition 
countries, Russia and China, fall in the $2,000 to $10,000 range along with Turkey, 
Brazil, Egypt, Thailand, and South Africa. Finally, in the category below $2,000 are 
found India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and most of Central and West Africa.  
Figure 1: World wealth levels in year 2000 
 
 
Regional wealth shares are interesting (see the last column of Table 2). North America 
owns about a third (34 per cent) of the world’s wealth. Europe has a fraction less (30 per 
cent) and rich Asia-Pacific is close behind at 24 per cent. The rest of the world shares 
the remaining 12 per cent. Figure 2 shows how these wealth shares compare to 
population shares. North America has the largest excess of wealth over its ‘fair share’ 
                                                 
13 For our purposes ‘North America’ includes only Canada and the USA. Mexico and the Central 
American countries are included in Latin America. 






according to population, which is a mere 5 per cent. Europe has more than double the 
population of North America, so that its large wealth share is more aligned with its 
population. The case of rich Asia-Pacific is intermediate between Europe and North 
America. 
Figure 2: Population and wealth shares by region 
 
Figure 3 compares the asset composition of wealth across a selection of countries. In the 
USA, according to our estimates, 42 per cent of gross household assets are in financial 
form. Among the countries for which we have data, this high ratio is approached only 
by the UK. As illustrated, Japan, Canada, and Germany have a considerably lower share 
of financial assets—averaging just 28 per cent. Interestingly, estimated financial assets 
are 22 per cent of the total in China, but just 5 per cent and 3 per cent in India and 
Indonesia respectively. Like Japan and several other East Asian countries before it, 
China has been experiencing a period of explosive growth and very high saving rates 
which has produced a strikingly different wealth composition than that found in low-
income developing countries. Household assets in the latter are heavily weighted 
towards land, livestock, and other agricultural assets. Financial development also lags, 




Figure 3: Asset composition in selected countries 
 
Figure 3 also suggests that debt is higher in the developed world, at least according to 
official data. However, it is possible that debts are especially under-reported in LDC 
sample surveys. Subramanian and Jayaraj (2006), for example, estimate that the true 
indebtedness of Indian households is about three times greater than that reported in the 
survey data. If so, total debt in India would be about 10 per cent of gross assets, similar 
to the level reported in the USA and Japan.  
Turning now to the membership of the wealth quantiles, Figure 4 charts the regional 
composition of the various global deciles. The corresponding numerical data is recorded 
in Table 2. ‘Thirds’ feature prominently in describing the overall pattern of results. 
India dominates the bottom third of the global wealth distribution, contributing a little 
under a third (28 per cent to be precise) of the bottom three deciles. The middle third of 
the distribution is the domain of China which supplies more than a third of those in 
deciles 4-8. North America, Europe and rich Asia-Pacific monopolize the top decile, 
each regional group accounting for around one third of the richest wealth holders, 
although the composition changes a little in the upper tail, with the North American 
share rising while European membership declines. Another notable feature is the 
relatively constant membership share of Asian countries other than China and India. 
However, as the figures indicate, this group is highly polarized, with the high-income 
sub-group populating the top end of the global wealth distribution and the lower income 
countries (especially Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam) occupying the 
lower tail. The population of Latin America is also fairly even spread across the global 
distribution but Africa, as expected, is heavily concentrated at the bottom end.  
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Figure 4: Regional composition of global wealth distribution 
 
 
Table 3 provides more details for a selection of countries. The list of countries includes 
all those which account for more than 1 per cent of global wealth or more than 1 per 
cent of those in the top decile, plus those additional countries with adult populations 
exceeding 45 million. They are arranged in order of the number of persons in the top 
global wealth decile.  
The number of members of the top decile depends on three factors: the size of the 
population, average wealth, and wealth inequality within the country. Unsurprisingly, 
the USA appears in first position, with 25 per cent of the global top decile (see Figure 5) 
and 37 per cent of the global top percentile. All three factors reinforce each other in this 
instance: a large population combining with very high wealth per capita and relatively 
unequal distribution. Japan features strongly in second place—more strongly than 
anticipated, perhaps—with 21 per cent of the global top decile and 27 per cent of the 
global top percentile. The high wealth per adult and relatively equal distribution 
accounts for the fact that the number of Japanese in the bottom half of the global wealth 
distribution is insignificant according to our figures. Italy, too, has a stronger showing 
than expected, for much the same reasons as Japan. 
Further down the list, China and India both owe their position to the size of their 
population. Neither country has enough people in the global top 5 per cent in 2000 to be 
recorded in Table 3. While the two countries are expected to be under-represented in the 
upper tail because of their relatively low mean wealth, their absence here from the top 5 
per cent seems anomalous. It may well reflect unreliable wealth data drawn from 
surveys that do not over-sample the upper tail, data which could be improved by making 15 
corrections for differential response and under-reporting.14 The representation of both 
China and India has been rising in the annual Forbes list of billionaires, so it is likely 
that more recent estimates of the membership of the top 5 per cent or top 1 per cent 
would not only record greater representation from these two countries, but also register 
an increasing trend over time.15 
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3.3  Adjusting for local prices 
As discussed earlier, it is natural to using official exchange rates to compare the wealth 
of the world’s super rich in different countries. Lower down the scale, however, the 
benefits (and valuations) of asset holdings may depend heavily on the local prices of 
goods and services, so it may be more appropriate to evaluate wealth in terms of what it 
would buy if liquidated and spent on consumption locally. To address this point, 
alternative estimates of the world distribution of wealth have been constructed on a PPP 
basis.16 
                                                 
14 The estimated membership figures for large countries may be especially unreliable, given that our 
procedures condense the population of each country into a sample of 1000, so a single sample point for 
China or India represents more than half a million adults. 
15 Ten years ago the Forbes list contained no billionaires from China. In 2007 there were 16. As late as 
2004, only 9 billionaires were reported in India. This number had risen to 36 by 2007. 
16 More detailed results are discussed in Davies et al. (2007). We use the PPP exchange rates from the 
Penn World Tables. 16 
Applying the PPP adjustment increases average wealth in most countries, and hence the 
global average, which rises from $33,875 per adult to $43,494 per adult. The admission 
fee for membership of the top wealth groups also increases. The price for entry to the 
top 10 per cent rises from $61,536 to $87,876, but entry to the top 1 per cent increases 
more modestly, from $512,386 to $517,601, reflecting the small impact of PPP 
adjustments within the richest nations. Because the PPP adjustment tends to be greater 
for poorer countries, switching to PPP valuations compresses the variation in average 
wealth levels across countries and hence provides a more conservative assessment of the 
degree of world wealth inequality. For example, the estimated wealth share of the 
richest individuals falls, from 85.2 per cent to 71.2 per cent for the top 10 per cent of 
wealth holders, and from 40.1 per cent to 31.9 per cent for the top 1 per cent. The global 
Gini value also declines, from 0.892 to 0.804 (although the Gini coefficients for 
individual countries are unaffected).  
The overall picture suggested by the PPP results is much the same as the pattern 
observed earlier with official exchange rates. India moves a little more into the middle 
deciles of the global wealth distribution, and both India and China are now recorded in 
the global top 5 per cent, although not in the top 1 per cent. Membership of the top 10 
per cent is a little more evenly spread regionally, principally due to a decline in the 
share of Japan, whose membership of the top 10 per cent falls from 21 per cent to 14 per 
cent as a result of the decline in Japan’s wealth per adult from $227,600 to $157,146 
when measured in PPP terms.  
As regards the rankings of individual countries, Brazil, India, Russia and Turkey are all 
promoted to the exclusive group of countries with more than 1 per cent of the members 
of the global top wealth decile. The most dramatic rise, however, is that of China which 
leapfrogs into sixth position with 4.1 per cent of the members. Even without an increase 
in wealth inequality, a relatively modest rise in average wealth in China in future years 
will move it up to third position in the global top decile (measured in PPP dollars), and 
overtaking Japan is not a remote prospect. 
In summary, it is clear that household wealth is much more concentrated, both in size 
distribution and geography, when official exchange rates rather than PPP valuations are 
employed. Thus a somewhat different perspective emerges depending on whether one is 
interested in the power that wealth conveys in terms of local consumption options or the 
power to act and have influence on the world financial stage. 
3.4 Reliability  of  results 
It was noted earlier that the countries for which wealth data are available include those 
most crucial to the overall world picture—the richest and poorest large nations. 
Nevertheless, we have had to rely on various estimation and imputation techniques in 
order to fill the many gaps in data coverage. So it is important to try to assess the 
robustness of our results to the assumptions and imputations made during the course of 
the study. 
With wealth measured in PPP terms, Davies et al. (2007) show that our main results are 
very robust to a number of alternative assumptions. The same is true when wealth is 
valued at official exchange rates. For example, omitting the large number of (mainly 
small) countries for which the wealth level or distributional shape were imputed using 17 
the average value of the corresponding region and income class has little effect on the 
global figures for wealth levels or inequality. Going further and restricting attention to 
the 20 countries for which direct data exist on both wealth levels and distributional 
shape leads to a modest reduction in the Gini coefficient from 0.892 to 0.887, again 
suggesting that the results are robust. Focussing on the same 20 countries, the use of 
income inequality as a proxy for wealth inequality was investigated by replacing the 
‘true’ wealth distribution figures with the income distribution derived estimate obtained 
as for other countries. This reduces the share of the top 1 per cent from 37.6 per cent to 
32.9 per cent, and the global Gini value from 0.887 to 0.880, suggesting that the income 
inequality proxy may lead to an underestimate of global wealth inequality, although the 
overall impact may be modest given that the countries involved hold less than 20 per 
cent of global wealth. 
Another way of checking our results is to consider countries which have some 
information on wealth inequality, although not complete data. Our imputed wealth 
distributions appear consistent with that partial information, adding to our confidence in 
the results. For example, Rogg (2008) reports a Gini coefficient of 0.59 for rural 
Ethiopia (which has 84 per cent of the country’s population according to the WDI) in 
1997, a moderate figure that does not conflict with our imputed figure of 0.652 for 
Ethiopia as a whole.17 Pinto (2006) estimates the distribution of wealth in Campinas, 
Brazil, a city with a population of about a million people using the estate-multiplier 
method. He obtains a Gini coefficient of 0.920 for 1996, which suggests that our figure 
of 0.784 for the country as a whole is not extreme.18 Torche and Spilerman (2008: 
Table 8.4b) report a Gini for land holding of 0.85 for Brazil—slightly above the median 
figure of 0.84 for 15 Latin American countries and well above the USA figure of 0.72. 
Our estimates show above-average wealth inequality for Latin America, consistent with 
this evidence on land inequality and with data on the distribution of some other 
important wealth components.19 
Other considerations also lead us to believe that our estimates of the top wealth shares 
are conservative. The survey data on which most of our estimates are based 
underrepresent the rich and do not reflect the holdings of the super-rich. Although the 
SCF survey in the USA does an excellent job in the upper tail, its sampling frame 
explicitly omits the ‘Forbes 400’ families. Surveys in other countries do not formally 
                                                 
17 Per capita wealth is significantly higher in urban than in rural areas in developing countries. Even if 
inequality in urban areas was no greater than in rural areas, one would therefore expect the national 
wealth Gini to exceed that for rural areas.  
18 Interestingly, Noyola (2000) obtains a much lower Gini coefficient for wealth in the city of Monterrey, 
Mexico in 1998, just 0.54 (this compares to our figure of 0.749 for Mexico as a whole). Noyola’s estimate 
is based, however, on a sample survey of about 1,000 families that did not over-sample the upper tail. The 
difference between the Pinto and Noyola results illustrates the importance of getting information on the 
truly rich for obtaining an accurate picture of overall wealth distribution.  
19 Torche and Spilerman (2008: Table 8.3b) report the Gini for housing wealth for nine Latin American 
countries. The range is from 0.56 in Uruguay to 0.85 in Bolivia (in these data non-owners are included in 
the calculation of the Gini, with zero wealth. In contrast, the Gini for landholding mentioned in our text 
above is just for landowners). Torche and Spilerman also compare data on the quintile shares for various 
forms of capital income. For income from capital, rents and profits in 16 countries they indicate a share of 
the top quintile ranging from 64 per cent in the Dominican Republic to 96 per cent in Guatemala. The 
median is 80 per cent.  18 
exclude the very rich, but it is rare for them to be captured. This means that our 
estimated shares of the top 1 per cent and 10 per cent are likely to err on the low side. A 
rough idea of the possible size of the error can be gained by noting that the total wealth 
of the world’s billionaires reported by Forbes for the year 2000, $2.16 trillion, was 1.7 
per cent of our estimate of $125.3 trillion for total world household wealth.  
Table 4: Estimated global numbers of US$ millionaires and billionaires, 2000, official 
exchange rate basis 
Wealth ($)  Number above 
1 million  13 674 966 
10 million  469 361 
100 million  16 110 
1 billion  553 
Source: See text. 
 





























The top tail of wealth distributions is often well approximated by the Pareto distribution 
which plots the logarithm of the number of persons above wealth level w against the 
logarithm of w. The outcome, depicted in Figure 6, shows a remarkable correspondence 
in the range from $250,000 to $5 million. Above $5 million the relationship breaks 
down, as expected given the limitations of the data sources and the lumpiness caused by 
using a single sample observation to represent many tens of thousands of adults. 
However, it seems reasonable to use a fitted Pareto curve to estimate the number of 19 
individuals in the highest echelons of the wealth distribution. This leads us to predict 
that more than 16,000 adults owned at least 100 million dollars in the year 2000, and 
that 553 persons were dollar billionaires (see Table 4). The latter figure is very close to 
the  Forbes estimate of 492 billionaires for the year 2000. Furthermore, Forbes 
magazine classifies 41 per cent of the billionaires as USA citizens, a proportion 
consistent with the figures in Table 3 which record a USA share of 37 per cent of the 
top 1 per cent, and suggests that the share is higher at higher wealth ranges. This degree 
of similarity may be a little misleading, since the Forbes list tends to refer to billionaire 
families rather than individuals. Nevertheless, our projections for the number of super 
rich adults add to our confidence that our global wealth distribution estimates are 
plausible. 
4  Trends over time 
This is the first comprehensive study of the world distribution of household wealth ever 
undertaken. Since our estimates are a snapshot for a single year, no time series exist on 
global wealth inequality. However, estimates of wealth inequality over time are 
available for several individual countries, and some comments can be made concerning 
changes over time in the size of international differences in wealth levels. It is 
interesting to look at the trends displayed by these pieces of the puzzle, although 
hazardous to draw conclusions about the trend in global wealth inequality on the basis 
of the limited evidence.  
Long time series of wealth inequality estimates are available for Denmark, France, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA and the UK (see Ohlsson et al. 2008). From the 
early years of the twentieth century up to the mid 1970s wealth inequality declined 
dramatically in all of these countries with the exception of Switzerland. This parallels 
the decline of income inequality observed over the same period. In contrast, wealth and 
income inequality have behaved somewhat differently during the last three decades 
wealth inequality in developed countries. Increases in income inequality have been 
strong in the USA and UK, and have been observed in most OECD countries over this 
period. While the wealth share of the top 1 per cent also increased in most countries 
during this period (Ohlsson et al. 2008), the increase in wealth inequality appears to 
have been generally weaker than that of income inequality. For example, in the USA 
while there was a mild increase in wealth concentration between the mid 1970s and the 
mid 1980s, and a further increase in the late 1990s, inequality then fell and the share of 
the top 1 per cent in 2001, at 33.4 per cent according to the Survey of Consumer 
Finance, did not differ much from the share of 33.8 per cent in 1983. 
One part of the explanation for the weaker increase of wealth inequality than of income 
inequality at the country level is suggested by the findings of Piketty and Saez (2003) 
who show that the rise in top income shares in the USA in recent decades is due mostly 
to increased earnings dispersion rather than to increased capital income at the top end. 
In other words, increased executive compensation and the like, rather than higher 
returns to rentiers, is driving higher income inequality among the rich and super rich. 
This is consistent with the observation of flat or slowly rising wealth inequality during a 
time of strongly increasing income inequality. A further element in the explanation 
likely lies in the large increases in house prices in the UK, the USA, and a number of 20 
other countries in the last 10-15 years. Housing is a ‘popular’ asset. It is relatively more 
important for the middle class than for the poor or the rich. Thus, increases in house 
prices tend to reduce top wealth shares and other measures of wealth inequality, thus 
opposing the trend towards higher wealth inequality coming from such sources as 
higher share prices.  
There is also some evidence on between-country trends for the seven major OECD 
economies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA. In 1994 the 
ratio of wealth to disposable income ranged from 4.72 for Canada to 7.47 for Japan. 
From 1994 to 1997 the unweighted dispersion fell for these countries, as the wealth-
income ratio declined somewhat for Japan but rose for the other countries. After 1997 
though, dispersion rose due to strong increases in wealth in France, Italy, and the UK, 
mostly associated with rising real estate prices. As a result, this group of countries 
showed about the same dispersion in the wealth-income ratio in 2004 as they did in 
1994.20  
Among developing countries, only China and India offer the prospect of comparisons 
over time. There is no apparent upward or downward trend in wealth inequality in India, 
where results from a large asset and debt survey are available at decennial intervals 
since 1981-82 (see Subramanian and Jayaraj 2006). On the other hand, wealth 
inequality has been rising at a strong pace in China, paralleling the rise of income 
inequality in that country. Between 1995 and 2002 the wealth Gini rose from 0.40 to 
0.55 according to survey evidence. As noted earlier, the number of Chinese billionaires 
on the Forbes list has also been rising significantly in the last few years. The 
disequalizing effect on world wealth distribution is offset, however, by the rise in mean 
wealth in China, which reduces between-country wealth inequality. Hence the net 
impact of wealth trends in China on global wealth inequality is unclear. 
Russia and the European transition countries also provide evidence of the link between 
rising wealth inequality and the shift from limited personal property under socialism to 
a market system (Guriev and Rachinsky 2008; Yemtsov 2008). However, the increase in 
wealth inequality in Central and Eastern Europe has been much less extreme than in 
Russia. Since the former countries have, on average, been experiencing reasonable 
economic growth in recent years, their mean wealth, which started from a low level, 
may have been rising fast enough to offset much of the impact of their higher wealth 
dispersion on global inequality. This cancellation has almost certainly not taken place 
for Russia, however, since its increase in wealth inequality has been extreme (see 
Guriev and Rachinsky 2008) and its growth performance has been relatively poor. 
While it is difficult to predict future trends in global wealth inequality, a few 
observations may be offered. First, as in the past, growth in GDP is likely to remain a 
major determinant of both the overall level of global wealth and the distribution across 
regions and countries. However, growth in wealth levels may not exactly match income 
growth rates. Aggregate wealth levels depend heavily on asset prices, especially real 
estate and equity values, and are also sensitive to institutional changes affecting 
property rights, such as moves towards privatization and property registration schemes. 
                                                 
20 The unweighted coefficient of variation in 2004 was 0.207, compared with 0.203 in 1994. 21 
On the whole, it seems likely that wealth will grow faster than income in the medium 
and long run. 
A second important factor concerns changes in exchange rates. Exchange rate 
movements have little impact on global income inequality measured in PPP dollars, 
since the PPP currency conversions sterilise most of the change. But if estimates of 
global wealth distribution employ official exchange rates, for the reasons discussed 
earlier, the impact could be significant, especially on the rankings of individual 
countries. Our estimates for the year 2000 are already likely to be out of date given the 
subsequent relative decline in the US dollar. Ceteris paribus, figures for more recent 
years should reduce somewhat the dominance of the USA in the global wealth picture. 
Whether wealth inequality will increase or subside in global terms also depends on 
wealth inequality trends in individual countries, on the level of wealth inequality in the 
faster growing countries, and on the population weight of the respective countries. 
Assembling these pieces of the puzzle suggests a crucial role for China during the next 
20 years. Strong economic growth coupled with an expansion in private property 
opportunities provide the foundation for a significant rise in the average level of wealth 
which in global terms is reinforced by the population size, but constrained by the 
managed currency peg to the US dollar. As Figure 4 makes clear, China is poised to 
make big inroads into the echelons of top wealth holders. The relative equality of wealth 
holdings in China mean that even a modest rise in the average level of wealth relative to 
the rest of the world will promote many into the top global wealth decile, and, given 
time, into the top global percentile. Indeed, more up-to-date data may reveal that this 
movement has already begun in earnest. 
Although India has a similar sized population, it is unlikely that Indian nationals will 
rapidly occupy many of the global top wealth slots for two reasons. First, the recent 
growth experience has not matched that of China. Secondly, wealth inequality is much 
greater, so there are significantly fewer wealth holders who can expect to be promoted 
into the global top wealth decile. The contrast is captured by the thin right tail of India 
in Figure 4 compared with the fat pattern of China above the global median wealth.  
Russia is another country whose super rich have made headlines in recent years. 
However, it is unlikely that many Russians will be in evidence among the wealth elite of 
the world in, say 20 years time, at least compared to Chinese. The much smaller (and 
shrinking) population and the higher concentration of wealth are the two principal 
factors limiting the expansion of Russian membership of the global top wealth decile. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has provided a first estimate of the world distribution of household wealth. It 
is evident that the distribution is highly concentrated—in fact much more concentrated 
than the world distribution of income, or the distribution of wealth within all but a few 
of the world’s countries. While the share of the top 10 per cent of wealth-holders within 
a country is typically about 50 per cent, and the median Gini value around 0.7, our 
figures for the year 2000 using official exchange rates suggest that for the world as a 
whole the share of the top 10 per cent was 85 per cent and the Gini equalled 0.892. By 22 
comparison, Milanovic (2005) estimates that the world income Gini was 0.795 in 1998. 
While wealth (and income) concentration is somewhat less when the estimates are done 
on a PPP basis, converting at official exchange rates is preferable for many purposes 
when studying wealth given the large share of wealth owned by people who can readily 
travel and invest globally.  
Much of the data used in this study derive from household surveys. This is not a big 
problem for the USA, which supplies 25 per cent of the world’s top 10 per cent of 
wealth holders—sophisticated techniques have been used by the Federal Reserve Board 
to ensure the reliability of its triennial Survey of Consumer Finance. Less striking, but 
still effective, steps have been adopted in some of the other wealthiest countries. While 
the super rich are not represented in these data, this does not significantly compromise 
measures of the overall degree of inequality. On the other hand, surveys in the major 
developing countries appear to have difficulties capturing the upper tail. Thus, while we 
have reasonable confidence in our estimates, a non-negligible error bound is attributable 
to the limitations of household surveys. 
The quality of our results also depends on other sources of data and on the procedures 
employed to estimate wealth levels and wealth inequality at country level. Full or partial 
data on household wealth exist for 39 countries, covering 61 per cent of the world’s 
population and all the major OECD economies. The figures are often constructed in 
conjunction with Flow of Funds data or the National Accounts, suggesting a solid 
foundation of reliable numbers from financial institutions and government statistical 
agencies. This generates some confidence in the basic sources.  
One of the most fascinating aspects of our results is the light they throw on the 
geographic distribution of world wealth and of the membership of the top wealth 
groups. About 34 per cent of the world’s wealth was held in the US and Canada in the 
year 2000, 30 per cent was held in Europe, and 24 per cent was in the rich Asia-Pacific 
group of countries. Africa, Central and South America, China, India and other Asia-
Pacific countries shared the remaining 12 per cent. The location of top wealth-holders is 
even more concentrated, with North America hosting 39 per cent of the top global 1 per 
cent of wealth-holders, and Europe and rich Asia-Pacific having 26 per cent and 32 per 
cent respectively. The high share of top wealth-holders in North America is particularly 
disproportionate, as this region contains just 6 per cent of the world population.  
Looking lower down in the global wealth distribution, India supplies about one third of 
the bottom three deciles, while China contributes about a third of the people in the 
fourth to seventh deciles. Latin America is fairly evenly spread across all deciles, 
reflecting the fact that wealth inequality in the region mimics that in the world as a 
whole, according to our estimates. Africa and low-income Asia-Pacific are heavily 
present at the bottom. While North America and rich Asia-Pacific have little 
representation in the bottom deciles, this is not true for Europe which comprises about 9 
per cent of the world’s population in the bottom three deciles.  
Information on the geographic distribution of wealth holders produces some 
straightforward but revealing observations about possible future global trends. For 
example, if the rapid growth observed in China and India continues it will likely have 
different consequences for the two countries’ representation in different parts of the 
global distribution. With its large current representation in the middle wealth deciles, 
China is poised to contribute a greatly increased number of people to the top deciles if 23 
its mean wealth continues to rise quickly. On the other hand, India has a relatively small 
number of people in the middle deciles compared with China, so the consequence of 
continued growth may be that Indians supplant the Chinese as the largest group in the 
middle wealth range.  
If current trends continue, the bottom deciles in the world wealth distribution may come 
to be increasingly dominated by Africa, Latin America, and low-income Asia-Pacific 
countries. While European transition countries are currently found among the bottom 
deciles, their increasing integration into Europe and fast growth in recent years suggest 
the likelihood of an upward movement of large number of people from this region. The 
success of so many people in rapidly growing Asian countries is very positive in terms 
of global welfare, but continued low wealth in Africa, Latin America, and low-income 
Asian-Pacific countries is a real concern. From a global perspective, the level of wealth 
in these areas is relatively lower than income. This points to a serious problem, since 
these are precisely the countries where having sufficient household wealth is the most 
crucial, due to the shocks and uncertainty people experience, the lack of social safety 
nets, and the lack of opportunities to borrow or insure on reasonable terms. Hopefully, 
one consequence of our study will be to focus attention on developing and improving 
the institutions and policies needed in these regions to help ordinary people acquire 
adequate personal assets.  
References 
Bourguignon, F., and C. Morrison (2002). ‘Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-
1992’, American Economic Reveiw 92(4): 727-44.  
Brandolini, A., L. Cannari, G. D’Alession, and I. Faiella (2004). ‘Household Wealth 
Distribution in Italy in the 1990s’, Termi di discussione 530, Bank of Italy: Rome. 
Davies, J.B., S. Sandström, A. Shorrocks, and E. Wolff (2007). ‘Estimating the Level 
and Distribution of Global Household Wealth’, UNU-WIDER Research Paper 
2007/77. 
Guriev, S., and A. Rachinsky (2008). ‘The Evolution of Personal Wealth in the Former 
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe’, in J.B. Davies (ed.), Personal Wealth 
from a Global Perspective, Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Kennickell, A. (2003). ‘A Rolling Tide: Changes in the Distribution of Wealth in the 
United States, 1989–2001’, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper 393, Levy 
Institute, Bard College: Annandale-on-Hudson NY. 
Milanovic, B. (2002). ‘True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First 
Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone’, Economic Journal 112: 51-92. 
Milanovic, B. (2005). Worlds Apart, Measuring International and Global Inequality, 
Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford. 
Noyola, J. (2000). The Distribution of Household Wealth in Monterey, Mexico in the 
1900s, PhD thesis, University of Notre Dame. 
Ohlsson, H., J. Roine, and D. Waldenström (2008). ‘Long-Run Changes in the 
Concentration of Wealth: An Overview of Recent Findings’, in J.B. Davies (ed.), 24 
Personal Wealth from a Global Perspective, Oxford University Press for UNU-
WIDER: Oxford. 
Piketty, T., and E. Saez (2003). ‘Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics CXVIII (1): 1-39. 
Pinto, N. (2006). ‘Personal Wealth in Brazil: The Estate-Multiplier Method in a 
Representative City of the State of São Paulo’, paper presented at the 29th 
Conference of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 20-
26 August, Joensuu. 
Rogg, C. (2008). ‘Asset Portfolios in Africa: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia’, in 
J.B. Davies (ed.), Personal Wealth from a Global Perspective, Oxford University 
Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Shorrocks, A., and G. Wan (2008). ‘Ungrouping Income Distributions: Synthesising 
Samples for Inequality and Poverty Analysis’, UNU-WIDER Research Paper 
2008/16. 
Subramanian, S., and D. Jayaraj (2006). ‘The Distribution of Household Wealth in 
India’, UNU-WIDER Research Paper 2006/116. 
Torche, F., and S. Spilerman (2008). ‘Household Wealth in Latin America’, in 
J.B. Davies (ed.), Personal Wealth from a Global Perspective, Oxford University 
Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Yemtsov, R. (2008) ‘Housing Privatization and Household Wealth in Transition’, in 
J.B. Davies (ed.), Personal Wealth from a Global Perspective, Oxford University 
Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
 